Question Description
I’m working on a history question and need an explanation and answer to help me learn.
Compare and contrast the issues of alienation and liberation during the 1950s. Resources= American- A Narrative History V2
FOCUS QUESTION 5:
What were President Eisenhower’s foreign policy priorities? What was his influence on global affairs? Resources= American- A Narrative History V2
In 1953, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) covertly orchestrated the overthrow of the democratically elected and very popular prime minister of Iran, Mohammed Mossadeq, an event that was not formally acknowledged by the CIA until 2011. And for most of the 1950s, the U.S. secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, regularly threatened the use of “massive retaliatory power.” Dulles’s aggressive actions and bold threats marked the foreign policy stance taken by President Eisenhower.
Dulles believed that the foreign policy of the previous administration was too reactive and dangerously weak. The strategy of “containment,” was not enough. The United States needed to forcefully beat communism back, and with a serious credible threat of force, even nuclear “brinksmanship.” Eisenhower and Dulles’s more aggressive anti-Communist foreign policy led to decisions many observers believe were illegal and had the effect of generating consequences that were more serious than the original threat of advancing communism, such as the sixty-year hostile relationship with Iran. Others believe that communism was not only a dangerous system, but in the 1950s was also seriously advancing around the world due to the support of the Soviet Union and Communist China. The documents for this Primary Source Exercise were generated during the “‘heat”‘ of the cold war and provide a glimpse into that decision-making process.
DOCUMENTS
Document 1 is a speech given by U.S. Secretary of State Dulles to the Council on Foreign Relations, Jan. 12, 1954. The speech lays out Dulles’s justification for a policy of credibly threatening to use “massive retaliatory power” against anyone who acts to advance communism or injure the interests of the United States.
Document 2 is Appendix A from CIA, Clandestine Services History, Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran: November 1952-August 1953, Dr. Donald N. Wilber, March 1954. Acquired from the National Security Archive, the “Initial Operational Plan for TPAJAX as cabled from Nicosia to Headquarters on 1 June 1953” details the actions taken to undermine popular and political support for Mohammad Mossadeq, preparing the way for his eventual overthrow and installation of the Shah of Iran as leader of that nation.
INSTRUCTIONS
1. Read Chapter 28 of the textbook, with special attention to pages 1177-1187.
2. Read Documents 1 and 2.
3. Answer the Focus Question.
DOCUMENT 1
U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on Massive Retaliation, January 12, 1954
The Need for Long Range Policies
This “long time” factor is of critical importance.
The Soviet Communists are planning for what they call “an entire historical era,” and we should do the same. They seek, through many types of maneuvers, gradually to divide and weaken the free nations by overextending them in efforts, which, as Lenin put it, are “beyond their strength, so that they come to practical bankruptcy.” Then, said Lenin, “our victory is assured.” Then, said Stalin, will be “the moment for the decisive blow.”
In the face of this strategy, measures cannot be judged adequate merely because they ward off an immediate danger. It is essential to do this, but it is also essential to do so without exhausting ourselves.
When the Eisenhower administration applied this test, we felt that some transformations were needed.
It is not sound military strategy permanently to commit U.S. land forces to Asia to a degree that leaves us no strategic reserves.
It is not sound economics, or good foreign policy, to support permanently other countries; for in the long run, that creates as much ill will as good will. Also, it is not sound to become permanently committed to military expenditures so vast that they lead to “practical bankruptcy.”
Change was imperative to assure the stamina needed for permanent security. But it was equally imperative that change should be accompanied by understanding of our true purposes. Sudden and spectacular change had to be avoided. Otherwise, there might have been a panic among our friends and miscalculated aggression by our enemies. We can, I believe, make a good report in these respects.
We need allies and collective security. Our purpose is to make these relations more effective, less costly. This can be done by placing more reliance on deterrent power and less dependence on local defensive power.
This is accepted practice so far as local communities are concerned. We keep locks on our doors, but we do not have an armed guard in every home. We rely principally on a community security system so well equipped to punish any who break in and steal that, in fact, would-be aggressors are generally deterred. That is the modern way of getting maximum protection at a bearable cost.
What the Eisenhower administration seeks is a similar international security system. We want, for ourselves and the other free nations, a maximum deterrent at a bearable cost.
Local defense will always be important. But there is no local defense which alone will contain the mighty landpower of the Communist world. Local defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power. A potential aggressor must know that he cannot always prescribe battle conditions that suit him. Otherwise, for example, a potential aggressor, who is glutted with manpower, might be tempted to attack in confidence that resistance would be confined to manpower. He might be tempted to attack in places where his superiority was decisive.
The way to deter aggression is for the free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing.
SOURCE: John Foster Dulles, “The Evolution of Foreign Policy,” Before the Council of Foreign Relations, New York, N.Y., Department of State, Press Release No. 81 (January 12, 1954).
DOCUMENT 2
Appendix A from 200-page CIA, Clandestine Services History, Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran: November 1952-August 1953, Dr. Donald N. Wilber, March 1954.
Note on abbreviations: SIS = British Secret Intelligence Service. CIA = American Central Intelligence Agency
SECRET
APPENDIX A
Initial Operational Plan for TPAJAX
As cabled from Nicosia to Headquarters
On 1 June 1953
Summary of Preliminary plan prepared by
SIS and CIA representatives in Cyprus
I. Preliminary Action
A. Interim Financing of Opposition
1. CIA will supply $35,000 to Zahedi
2. SIS will supply $25,000 to Zahedi
3. SIS indigenous channels Iran will be used to supply funds above to Zahedi.
4. CIA will attempt to subsidize key military leaders if this necessary.
B. Acquisition Shah Cooperation
1. Stage 1: Convince the Shah that UK and US have joint aim and remove pathological fear of British intrigues against him.
a. Ambassador Henderson call on the Shah to assure him of US-UK common aid and British supporting him not Mossadeq.
b. Henderson to say to the Shah that special US representative will soon be introduced to him for presentation joint US-UK plan.
2. Stage 2: Special US representative
a. Presentation to the Shah
(1) Both governments consider oil question secondary.
(2) Major issue is to maintain independence Iran and keep from the Soviet orbit. To do this Mossadeq must be removed.
(3) Present dynasty best bulwark national sovereignty.
(4) While Mossadeq in power no aid for Iran from US.
(5) Mossadeq must go.
(6) US-UK financial aid will be forthcoming to successor government.
(7) Acceptable oil settlement will be offered but successor government will not be rushed into it.
b. Demands on the Shah
(1) You must take leadership in overthrow Mossadeq.
(2) If not, you bear responsibility for collapse of country.
(3) If not, Shah’s dynasty will fall and US-UK backing of you will cease.
(4) Who do you want to head successor government? (Try and maneuver Shah into naming Zahedi.)
(5) Warning not to discuss approach.
(6) Plan of operation with Zahedi will be discussed with you.
II. Arrangement with Zahedi
A. After agreement with Shah per above, inform Zahedi he chosen to head successor government with US-UK support.
B. Agree on specific plan for action and timetable for action. There are two ways to put Zahedi in office.
1. Quasi-legally, whereby the Shah names Zahedi Prime Minister by royal firman.
2. Military coup.
Quasi-legal method to be tried first. If successful at least part of machinery for military coup will be brought into action. If it fails, military coup will follow in a matter of hours.
III. Relations with the Majlis
Important for quasi-legal effort. To prepare for such effort deputies must be purchased.
A. Basic aim is to secure 41 votes against Mossadeq and assure quorum for quasi-legal move by being able to depend on 53 deputies in Majlis. (SIS considers 20 deputies now not controlled must be purchased.)
B. Approach to deputies to be done by SIS indigenous agent group. CIA will backstop where necessary by pressures on Majlis deputies and will provide part of the funds.
IV. Relations with Religious Leaders
Religious leaders should:
A. Spread word of their disapproval of Mossadeq.
B. As required, stage political demonstrations under religious cover.
C. Reinforce backbone of the Shah.
D. Make strong assurances over radio and in mosques after coup that new government faithful Muslim principles.
Possibly as quid pro quo prominent cleric Borujerdi would be offered ministry without portfolio or consider implementing neglected article constitution providing body five mullas (religious leaders) to pass on orthodoxy of legislation.
E. Should be encouraged to threaten direct action against pro-Mossadeq deputies.
V. Relations with Bazaar
Bazaar contacts to be used to spread anti-government rumors and possibly close bazaar as anti-government expression.
VI. Tudeh
Zahedi must expect violent reaction from Tudeh and be prepared to meet with superior violence.
A. Arrest at least 100 party and Front Group leaders.
B. Seal off South Tehran to prevent influx Tudeh demonstrations.
C. Via black leaflets direct Tudeh members not to take any action.
VII. Press and Propaganda Program
A. Prior coup intensify anti-Mossadeq propaganda.
B. Zahedi should quickly appoint effective chief of government press and propaganda who will:
1. Brief all foreign correspondents.
2. Release advance prepared US and UK official statements.
3. Make maximum use Radio Tehran.
VIII. Relations with Tribes
A. Coup will provoke no action from Bakhtiari, Lurs, Kurds, Baluchi, Zolfaghari, Mamassani, Boer Ahmadi, and Khamseh tribal groups.
B. Major problem is neutralization of Qashqa’i tribal leaders.
IX. Mechanics of Quasi-Legal Overthrow
A. At this moment the view with most favor is the so-called [redacted] plan, whereby mass demonstrators seek religious refuge in Majlis grounds. Elements available to religious leaders would be joined by those supplied by bazaar merchants, up to 4,000 supplied by SIS controlled group, and additional elements supplied through CIA.
B. Would be widely publicized that this refuge movement on basis two grounds popular dissatisfaction with Mossadeq government as follows:
1. Ground one that Mossadeq government basically anti-religious as most clearly demonstrated ties between Mossadeq and Tudeh; and Mossadeq and USSR. Just prior to movement CIA would give widest publicity to all fabricated documents proving secret agreement between Mossadeq and Tudeh.
2. Ground two that Mossadeq is leading the country into complete economic collapse through his unsympathetic dictatorship. Just prior to movement CIA would give widest publicity to the evidence of illegally issued paper money. CIA might have capability to print masses excellent imitation currency which would be overprinted by this message.
C. Religious refuge to take place at the dawn of the coup day. Immediately followed by effort have Majlis pass a motion to censure the government. This is to be followed by the dismissal of Mossadeq and the appointment of Zahedi as successor. If successful, the coup would be completed by early afternoon. Failing success the coup would be mounted later that evening.
SOURCE: http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB28/appendix A.pdf
